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I 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. JURISDICTION. This Court has jurisdiction over 
this action by virtue of 78-2a-3(2)(d), which grants this Court 
appellant jurisdiction over appeals from the circuit courts.. 
2. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS. This appeal is based upon 
a JUDGMENT entered by the Third Circuit Court of Salt Lake 
County, Salt Lake Department, on October 11, 1989, the Honorable 
Robin Reese presiding. The controversy below arose out of a 
contract dispute relative to the shipping by Appellant of 
drilling mud to Florida on Respondent's trucks. Appellant had 
contacted an agent of Respondent to negotiate a price, and 
understood from the negotiations that a certain number of trucks 
at a certain price would be needed. When Appellant was later 
billed for additional charges, Appellant refused to pay, which 
resulted in the filing of the civil action. 
Later on, as the parties attempted to work out their 
differences, Appellant's president sent Respondent a $3,400 check 
with an attached letter indicating that the payment Mwill satisfy 
all claims against [Appellant] by [Respondent] and [Respondent] 
will dismiss all pending legal action . . . .!l Respondent 
accepted and deposited the check in its bank account, but did not 
sign the attached memorandum. 
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The trial court found that the matter was controlled by 
49 U.S. Code §10761 [Interstate Commerce Act]. Citing this and 
other cases, the trial court found that even if Respondent had 
misquoted a lower tariff rate, Appellant was bound to pay the 
legal tariff rate, which in this case was higher. The court 
further stated that the defense of accord and satisfaction was 
not available to Appellant. 
Further, the trial court refused to dismiss the case 
after trial on the basis that no enforceable contract had been 
proved as well as Appellant's motion below that the matter should 
have been referred to and decided by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. 
II 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the court committed reversible error in 
failing to find that there lacked a meeting of the minds at the 
time these parties attempted to negotiate their contract, such 
that no enforceable agreement between the parties was ever 
consummated. 
2. Whether the trial court, in its decision of 
October 11, 1989, committed reversible error by considering 
itself bound by the legal principles of the case of Caravan 
2 
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3. Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
4. 70A-3-202(2), Utah Code: 
An indorsement must be written by or on behalf 
of the holder and on the instrument or on a 
paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a 
part thereof. 
70A-3-206(3), Utah Code: 
. . . any transferee under an indorsement 
which is conditional . . . must pay or apply 
any value given by him for or on the security 
of the instrument consistently with the 
indorsement . . . . 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings Below 
and Disposition. A. The Complaint below was filed on July 10, 
1987, wherein it was alleged that Appellant was obligated to 
Respondent in the sum of $6,987. Respondent answered the 
Complaint on July 17, 1987, alleging failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted; estoppel; failure of 
consideration; statute of frauds; and impossibility of recovery 
because of Respondent's own fraud. 
B. The parties engaged in discovery efforts through 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, after 
which Respondent amended its Complaint to allege a credit in 
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(Transcript, P. 33, L. 18) and then stating that each of two 
trucks would that rate. (Transcript, P. 33, LL. 19-22) 
D. Respondent's manager testified that this 
information was conveyed to Appellant and that it was agreed to. 
(Transcript, P. 33, L. 19 - P. 34, L. 10) 
B. Appellant's drilling mud was sent to Florida on 
five single trailers, which Respondent's manager testified were 
necessary, given the load limitations and requirements on each 
trailer. (Transcript, P. 52, L. 19 - P. 53, L. 1) 
F. On May 15, 1986, Respondent's manager sent a 
letter to Appellant (trial Exhibit 12) confirming the price of 
$4,658 total for two full sets of double trailers and stating: 
[t]hese two invoices are for the original four 
trailer loads that we expected to haul for 
Nova Mud Corp. This was the agreed to cost of 
$2 per vehicle mile. [emphasis added] 
G. Mr. Perry, Respondent's manager, testified at the 
time of trial that the letter of May 15, 1986, was incorrectly 
issued. (Transcript, P. 56, LL. 20-24 and P. 57, LL. 3-9) 
H. Mr. Perry seemed confused at the time of trial 
relative to the meaning of ''vehicle" as it applies to the 
computation of charges under the tariff. He first stated that 
MIn my industry a vehicle means one single trailer." 
(Transcript, P. 51, L. 16) When questioned further, however, and 
6 
in reference to Exhibit 4, Item 162, he admitted that the word 
"vehicle" can and does refer to a tractor and rw£ trailers. 
(Transcript P. 72, LL. 16-24) 
I. Perry further admitted, (Transcript, P. 86-87) 
that had the equipment been available, i.e., trailers of forty-
five feet in length, that the merchandise shipped by Respondent 
could have been transported on two trailers instead of four. 
J. Appellant's president had hired freight companies 
on an ongoing basis in the past, and was used to getting forty-
five foot trailers (Transcript, P. 110, L. 15) and paying freight 
rates at approximately $1 per mile. (Transcript, P. 112, L. 
8-12) 
K. Appellant's president's understanding was that the 
agreement was for $1 per mile for one truck unit. (Transcript, P. 
114, L. 19 - P. 115, L. 5) 
L. Newman's understanding of "one truck unit" was a 
unit with as many trailers as could be hauled legally behind a 
truck. 
M. Appellant would not have hired Respondent if 
Appellant had understood $2 per mile per trailer or per truck 
unit would be the charges. (Transcript, P. 116, LL. 7-14) 
N. Appellant moved in a timely manner to send this 
matter to the Interstate Commerce Commission for determination 
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and to dismiss because of the failure of Respondent to prove an 
enforceable contract at the time of trial. (R, 123) 
0. After the material was shipped to the state of 
Florida, a dispute developed regarding the amount actually due 
Respondent for its services. On July 31, 1987, Appellant?s 
president sent to Respondent a check in the amount of $3,400, 
attached to which was a memorandum of understanding signed by 
Appellant that the $3,400 was being made in full payment of any 
amounts claimed and that Respondent would dismiss all pending 
legal action arising from invoices which are the subject matter 
of this action. 
P. Respondent received the check and negotiated the 
same, but did not sign the memorandum of understanding 
accompanying it. (Defendant's Exhibits 2 and 1, respectively) 
V 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1. There was no "meeting of the minds11 at the 
time this alleged agreement was negotiated, thereby precluding 
Respondent from enforcing it. There was unresolved confusion 
relative to the number of trailers and the allocation and 
application of the tariff rate to the number of trailers. Since 
these points were critical to the agreement, there is no 
enforceable contract. 
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POINT 2. A. The evidence propounded by Respondent at 
the time of trial is legally insufficient to establish the 
correct tariff applicable to these proceedings. Accordingly, 
without that information, it is objectively impossible for the 
court to legally determine any amounts due and owing. 
POINT 2. B. The provisions of 49 U.S.C. §10761 
proscribing negotiation of a tariff are not applicable to this 
case. In this case, the dispute was not on the amount of the 
tariff, but was on the number of trucks and trailers necessary to 
convey the cargo. Accordingly, Appellant is not foreclosed from 
asserting the position that Respondent was bound by the 
restrictive indorsement on the $3,400 check of July 31, 1987. 
POINT 3. In view of the foregoing arguments, 
Respondent was bound by the restrictive indorsement on the $3,400 
check of July 31, 1987, and for that reason is foreclosed from 
asserting any undercharges. This is not proscribed by 49 U.S.C. 
§10761, given the fact that the dispute was over the number of 
trailers and the application of the rate to the number of 
trailers, and not a dipute over the rate to be applied. 
POINT 4. The Interstate Commerce Commission has 
primary jurisdiction over determining issues of this kind. If 
this court does not have the power to allow Appellant to assert 
its defenses supposedly proscribed by 49 U.S.C. §10761, but the 
9 
ICC is, than to avoid trampling on Appellant's constitutional 
rights to equal protection and due process of law, the court must 
refer the matter to the Interstate Commerce Commission for 
determination, 
VI 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THB COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY CONCLUDING 
THAT THERE WAS AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
Although the court, in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R., 182-185) does not specifically make a 
finding that there was an enforceable contract between the 
parties, the fact the court granted judgment as prayed against 
Defendant necessarily presupposes that there was such a contract. 
Appellant believes that this conclusion constitutes reversible 
error on the part of the court, and that the record clearly shows 
that there was no meeting of the mind between the parties, and 
hence no enforceable contract. 
A number of Utah cases are illustrative on the issue. 
In the case of John Call Engineering v. Manti City Corp., Utah, 
743 P.2d 1205 (1987), the court set forth the general proposition 
relating to contract formation. Citing the earlier Utah case of 
10 
Oberhansly v^ Earle, Utah, 572 P.2d 1384 (1977) with approval, 
the court stated at 1207 that 
. . . it is a basic principle of contract law 
that there can be no contract without the 
mutual assent of the parties. [citations 
omitted] In this regard, the intentions of 
the parties to a contract are controlling, and 
generally those intentions will be found in 
the instrument itself. However, if a writing 
is not sufficient to establish meaning, resort 
may be had to extraneous evidence manifesting 
the intention of the parties. [citations 
omitted] 
Another 1987 case, Mooney v. GR & Associates, Utah 
App., 746 P.2d 1174 (1987) provides further direction on this 
point. At 1178, the court made the following observations: 
It is well settled that a contract is voidable 
if there is a mutual mistake of material fact, 
[citing] Kiahtipes v^ Mill, Utah, 649 P.2d 9, 
13 (1982); Langston v. McQuarrie, Utah App., 
741 P.2d 554, 557 (19877 and Renner v. Kehl, 
Arizona, 722 P.2d 262, 264-65 T19T57. 
However, there can be no mutual mistake as to 
an event which is occur in the future. The 
Colorado Supreme Court recognized this rule 
when it stated that: 
A party may rescind a contract when, at 
the time a contract is made, the parties 
make a mutual mistake about a material 
fact, the existence of which is basic 
assumption of the contract. If the 
parties harbor only mistake and 
expectations as to the course of future 
events and there assumptions as to facts 
existing at the time of the contract are 
correct, recission [sic] is not proper. 
This rule is justified by the reality that 
parties to commercial contract rarely 
predict future events with total accuracy. 
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I n d e e d , a c o n t r a c t o f t e n f u n c t i o n s 
p r i m a r i l y to i n s u l a t e t h e p a r t i e s from 
u n c e r t a i n t y and to a l l o c a t e t h e r i s k of 
f u t u r e e v e n t s . [ c i t i n g ] Bea l s v. T r i - B 
A s s o c , Colorado App., 64"? P. 2 d~~7 8 , 8 0 
(1082) 
In t h i s case , i t seems c l e a r from the record t h a t the 
p a r t i e s never had a "mee t i ng of t he minds11 from t h e o u t s e t , 
thereby not only j u s t i f y i n g , but a l so mandating the r e s c i s s i o n 
of the a t tempted agreement between the p a r t i e s . 
The c o u r t i t s e l f has r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e r e was no 
meeting of the minds in i t s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (R, 182-185) 
In t h i s regard, the court s t a t e d (R, 182) as fo l lows : 
The c o u r t f i n d s t he f o l l o w i n g to have been 
e s t a b l i s h e d : 
In March of 1986, Charles Perry, employee of 
the p l a i n t i f f company, was contacted by Larry 
Newman of t h e d e f e n d a n t . Newman i n d i c a t e d 
t h a t he w a n t e d t o s h i p 90 ,000 pounds of 
d r i l l i n g mud to Cape C a n a v e r a l , F l o r i d a and 
asked what i t would c o s t to sh ip the same. 
P e r r y q u o t e d a r a t e of $2 p e r m i l e p e r 
t r u c k l o a d a n t i c i p a t i n g t h a t two t r u c k l o a d s 
( t r a c t o r s ) would be needed to haul the cargo. 
Newman somehow u n d e r s t o o d t h a t on ly one 
trucTTToa!T~was n e c e s s a r y t o hau l t h e 90,(100 
pound ca7go and t h a t t h e T h a r g e was $"1 pe r 
mi le , [emphasis added] 
The tes t imony at t r i a l fu r the r confirms the fac t t ha t 
t he re never was a meeting of the minds between the two p a r t i e s . 
Per ry , the te rmina l manager of Respondent, t e s t i f i e d as fo l lows: 
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1. T h a t he had a t e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h L. A. 
Newman, a p r i n c i p a l of A p p e l l a n t , who c o n t a c t e d Mr. P e r r y by 
t e l e p h o n e t o o b t a i n r a t e s on t h e c a r r i a g e of d r i l l i n g mud from 
West J o r d a n , U tah t o Cape C a n a v e r a l , F l o r i d a . ( T r a n s c r i p t , P. 
23 , LL. 15 t h r o u g h P. 3 1 , L. 2) 
2 . P e r r y t h e n t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e c o n t a c t e d h i s 
d i v i s i o n manager ( T r a n s c r i p t , P. 32, L. 2) and then quoted t h a t 
r a t e t o A p p e l l a n t , which was $2 pe r m i l e . ( T r a n s c r i p t P. 33 , LL. 
12-14) P e r r y ' s t e s t i m o n y was t h a t t h e r a t e was $2 pe r m i l e fo r 
2 ,329 m i l e s (The d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n West J o r d a n , Utah and Cape 
C a n a v e r a l , F l o r i d a ) n [ f ] o r two t r u c k l o a d s , f o u r t r a i l e r s . " 
( T r a n s c r i p t , P. 3 3 , LL. 1 4 - 1 8 ) P e r r y t h e n t e s t i f i e d t h a t he 
conveyed t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n t o A p p e l l a n t and t h a t i t was ag reed t o . 
( T r a n s c r i p t P. 33 , L. 19 t h rough P. 34, L. 10) 
3 . M r . P e r r y f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t a 
" t r u c k l o a d " i s ff. . . e i t h e r a f o r t y or f o r t y - f i v e f o o t t r a i l e r 
o r a s e t of d o u b l e s w h i c h a r e t w e n t y - s e v e n f o o t [ s i c ] long. 1 1 
( T r a n s c r i p t , P. 27, L. 5-6) In t h i s c a s e , A p p e l l a n t ' s d r i l l i n g 
mud was s e n t on f i v e s i n g l e t r a i l e r s , which Mr. P e r r y t e s t i f i e d 
were n e c e s s a r y , g iven t h e load l i m i t a t i o n s and r e q u i r e m e n t s on 
each t r a i l e r . ( T r a n s c r i p t , P. 52, L. 19 t h rough P. 53 , L. 1) 
D e s p i t e Mr. P e r r y ' s s u r e n e s s of t h e t e r m s of t h e 
a l l e g e d a g r e e m e n t a t t h e t i m e of t r i a l , Mr. P e r r y , on May 1 5 , 
13 
1986, had sent a letter to Appellant confirming the total price 
of $4,658 which can either mean $1 per mile for each double 
trailer or $2 per mile for all vehicles collectively. The 
letter, which was offered and received as Exhibit 12 at the time 
of trial ''confirms" the confusion. The letter reflects a total 
of $4,658 for two numbered invoices and states in pertinent part 
that 
[tjhese two invoices are for the original four 
trailer loads that we expected to haul for 
Nova Mud Corp. This was the agreed to cost 
of $2 per vehicle mile, [emphasis added] 
During the trial, Mr. Perry testified that the letter 
of May 15, 1986, confirming the erroneous amounts, as well as the 
original invoices, were incorrectly issued. (Transcript, P. 56, 
LL. 22-24 and P. 57, LL. 3-9) 
To compound the confusion, Mr. Perry testified at the 
time of trial that the published tariff in effect at the time the 
service was performed for Appellant was for 200$ per mile per 
vehicle used. (Transcript P. 63, LL. 22-24) Since it was 
obvious that there was significant confusion between both parties 
as to the meaning of "vehicle'1 for purposes of their agreement, 
Mr. Perry was questioned regarding the meaning of the word 
"vehicle." (Transcript, P. 71, LL. 1-16) Mr. Perry at first 
stated unequivocably that "In my industry a vehicle means one 
single trailer." (Transcript, P. 71, L. 16) However, when 
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q u e s t i o n e d f u r t h e r and w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o E x h i b i t 4 (and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y r e f e r r i n g to the four th page of Exhibi t 4, Item 162, 
wherein i t i s s t a t e d ". . . in a veh ic le c o n s i s t i n g of not more 
than two t r a i l e r s . . . . " ) , Mr. P e r r y r e c a n t e d h i s p r e v i o u s 
tes t imony and admit ted t ha t the word "veh ic le" can and does r e fe r 
to a t r a c t o r and two t r a i l e r s . ( T r a n s c r i p t , p . 72, 11. 16-24) 
Perry a l so admit ted (Transc r ip t , p. 86-87) t h a t had the equipment 
been a v a i l a b l e , i . e . , t r a i l e r s of f o r t y - f i v e fee t in l eng th , t ha t 
the merchandise shipped by Appellant could have been t r anspo r t ed 
on two t r a i l e r s ins tead of four! 
La r ry A. Newman, A p p e l l a n t ! s P r e s i d e n t , t e s t i f i e d as 
f o l l o w s r e g a r d i n g t h e " a g r e e m e n t " b e t w e e n A p p e l l a n t and 
Respondent: 
1. La r ry A. Newman c o n t a c t e d Respondent to ". . . 
n ego t i a t e a f r e igh t r a t e to Flor ida ." (Transcr ip t P. 110, L. 9) 
2. Appellant in the past had h i red f r e i g h t companies 
on an ongoing b a s i s , and was used to using f u l l f o r t y - f i v e foot 
t r a i l e r s . ( T r a n s c r i p t , P. 110, L. 15) 
3 . A p p e l l a n t u s u a l l y was a b l e to ge t f r e i g h t r a t e s 
per loaded mile from 83<t to $1.10 per mi le . (T ransc r ip t , P. I l l , 
LL. 7-12) 
4. During Lar ry A. Newman's f i r s t c o n v e r s a t i o n 
[ o s t e n s i b l y with Mr. P e r r y ] , he to ld Respondent t h a t he was in 
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the habit of paying around $1 per mile and "Could he do it for 
that?11 (Transcript, P. 112, L. 8-12) 
5. Mr. Newman's understanding was that the agreement 
was for $1 per mile for one truck unit. (Transcript, P. 114, 
L. 19 - P. 115, L. 5) 
6. Furthermore, flone truck unit" was a unit with as 
many trailers as could be hauled legally behind a truck. 
(Transcript , P. 116, LL. 4-6) 
7. Appellant would not have hired Respondent if Larry 
A. Newman had understood $2 per mile would be the charges. 
(Transcript, P. 116, LL. 7-14) 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion and the 
authorities that there was in fact no "meeting of the minds." It 
is further clear that there was a mistake of fact as to more than 
one ". . . basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based 
their bargain." Langston v. McQuarrie, Utah App., 741 P.2d 554, 
557 (1987) [citing] Bailey v. Ewing, Idaho App., 671 P.2d 1099 
(1983). In this case, the basic assumptions and facts vital to 
the contract were (1) the price per trailer; and/or (2) the 
number of trailers required. Either of these is individually 
sufficient to rescind the agreement, if misunderstood. Also, it 
would be unusual for a mileage rate to be agreed on, or imposed 
by statute, without an agreement as to the number of vehicles 
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necessary for the transport. It is clear, as evidenced by the 
May 15, 1986 letter of Perry to Appellant, that even Perry had 
made a mistake in the terms of the agreement, which he later 
tried to explain away. Furthermore, it is clear from the 
testimony of Larry A. Newman, which stands unrefuted on the 
record, that his understanding was something else. Clearly, from 
the outset, there was no meeting of the minds and, under the 
authorities cited herein, no enforceable agreement. 
In anticipation that Respondent may argue there was no 
motion before the court to dismiss under the theory of lack of an 
enforceable contract, the undersigned asserts that in fact, the 
motion was made during closing arguments. Because the transcript 
of the closing arguments was for some reason not reproduced, that 
is unavailable for perusal. However, the court's notes (R., 234) 
clearly show that at the "defense closing" the issue of "no K 
[contract], because of no meeting of the minds" was raised. 
POINT 2 
UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS 
RELIANCE ON 49 U.S.C. §10761 AND THE CASES 
CITED IN THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Respondent failed at the time of trial to prove 
the tariff rate or its applicability to the alleged agreement 
between the parties. 
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The court found that as a matter of law the parties to 
this action cannot legally deviate from published rate. (R, 184-
185) However, in this case, even if it is assumed that the 
parties did not have the legal capability of modifying the rate 
to be charged, or even compromising the claim not in accordance 
with the published rate schedules, there is still reversible 
error. 
In this case, the lack of an initial agreement is of 
paramount importance, since the amount actually charged would be 
contingent upon the number of vehicles actually pulled behind a 
given trailer. Thus, the rate would remain the same, while the 
gross amount charged for the entire job could well vary, 
depending on the number of 'Vehicles'1 used. Mr. Perry, on direct 
examination, was questioned by his own attorney regarding the 
charges (Transcript, P. 28, L. 8-18), which testimony follows: 
Q. [by Ms. Van Frank] That gives you how many 
trailers? 
A. [by Mr. Perry] Four, on the original 
quote. 
Q. What does the 4658 to at the bottom? 
A. After communicating with my supervisor on 
what the rate we could handle this would be, 
it was $2 a mile times 2,329, $4,658. 
Q. For how many trailers? 
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A. P e r tr uckload. F o u r trailers, [emphas I s 
added] " " 
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B# The authorities relied upon by the court are not 
applicable to the facts of this case. 
The court obviously gave great deference to 49 U.S.C. 
§10761 and the cases cited in his Conclusions Df Law, i.e. 
Caravan Refrigerated Cargo v. Supreme Beef Processors, 864 F.2d 
388 (1989); Louisville and Nashville RY v^ MaxwelL, 237 U.S. 94 
(1915); and Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Standard Milling, 508 
F.Supp. 277 (1981). 
A close scrutiny of these cases, however, reveals that 
they are not applicable to the facts of the instant case. In 
each of the cases, the issue before the court was whether a 
misquotation could constitute a defense to an action for 
undercharges. In the Supreme Beef Processors case at 392, the 
court held as follows: 
A shipper that pleads unreasonableness as a 
defense cannot prevent enforcement of the 
filed tariff doctrine or force the district 
court to stay proceedings and refer the case 
to the commission. [citations omitted] 
In the Consolidated Rail Corp. case the court was faced 
with a question relating to demurrage charges, which charges in 
that case were set by tariffs under 49 U.S.C. §10741(a). The 
court, at 279 stated that 
[u]nder 49 U.S.C. §10761(a), a carrier may not 
charge or receive a rate different than the 
rate prescribed in the applicable tariff. 
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However, of vital importance to this case before the 
court as well as the Consolidated Rail Corp. case, is the latter 
court's statement at 280, as follows: 
Standard [the defendant] may, of course, plead 
and attempt to prove its defense that the 
demurrage charges sought by ConRail were 
caused by ConRailfs own fault. 
Thus, it is clear that the Consolidated court relies 
upon the pre-established fact that there was no legitimate 
dispute about the terms of the agreement as it relates to a 
tariff. As long as there was no attempt to negotiate a tariff 
different from that established by statute, there was no 
proscription against a defense equitable or otherwise. Such is 
the case here. Nova Mud is not attempting to state at this point 
that it has the right to renegotiate the rate or enter into an 
enforceable accord and satisfaction relating to a dispute over 
the rate. The rate is what it is as reflected in the applicable 
tariff. While Appellant does not concede that the rate 
applicable in this case has been adequately proved by Respondent, 
and in fact disputes that it has, it does agree that the rate 
cannot be a subject of negotiation. However, in this case as in 
the Consolidated case, Nova Mud has the right to assert and have 
considered other defenses which do not constitute an attempt to 
renegotiate the actual rate. As set forth above, Nova Mud 
21 
alleges that (1) Respondent did not prove what the actual rate 
was; (2) that whatever the rate was, it was unjustifiably 
doubled, or even tripled, by Respondent in violation of the terms 
of the agreement, if there were one; and in the alternative, that 
there was no agreement upon which to base the charges for 
carriage. 
POINT 3 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT RESPONDENT WAS BOUND BY THE RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT 
ON THE $3,400 CHECK PAID BY APPELLANT ON JULY 31, 1987 
According to the court's Findings of Fact (R, 183-184), 
the court stated the following: 
At some later date a dispute developed over 
the amount actually due to the plaintiff for 
its services. In an effort to settle the 
dispute, Larry Newman gave a $3,400 check to 
an employee of the plaintiff with an attached 
letter indicating that the said payment "will 
satisfy all claims against Nova by 
Consolidated Freights and C.F. will dismiss 
all pending legal action ." The 
plaintiff accepted and deposited the check in 
its bank account. 
According to the provisions of 70A-3-206(3), Utah Code 
(Uniform Commercial Code), 
. . . any transferee under an indorsement 
which is conditional . . . must pay or apply 
any value given by him for or on the security 
of the instrument consistently with the 
indorsement . . . . 
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A previous section, 70A-3-202(2), provides certain 
requirements for an indorsement as follows: 
An indorsement must be written by or on behalf 
of the holder and on the instrument or on a 
paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a 
part thereof. 
Since the court held that the conditions of negotiation 
were met, it is Appellant's position that Respondent was bound by 
the indorsement and that its acceptance and use of the funds 
legally foreclose it from pursuing Appellant here. 
No doubt Respondent's argument will be that the 
provisions of 49 U.S. Code §10761 control here, as the court 
found, and that the acceptance of the restrictively indorsed 
check was a legally nullity as far as a dispute over the amount 
owed was concerned. 
Appellant concedes that this would be the probable 
result _if the question had to do with a dispute over the tariff 
charged. However, as has been pointed out above, this is not the 
case here. Appellant asserts that the check written on July 31, 
1987, along with its indorsement (Defendant's exhibits 2 and 1, 
respectively), reflect a dispute not about the tariff rate, but 
rather a dispute about the number of conveyances to be used and 
the allocation of the appropriate tariff rate among the number of 
vehicles. Appellant believed then and continues to believe that 
it had and has every right to question the number of vehicles 
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unilaterally utilized by Respondent as well as the application of 
the tariff rate to the number of vehicles. When Respondent 
negotiated the check under the circumstances described herein, it 
bound itself to an enforceable agreement relating to those 
issues, thereby exculpating Appellant from any liability further 
than the $3,400 paid. 
POINT 4 
THIS COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING 
TO REFER THE QUESTION OF THE DISPUTE BEFORE IT 
TO THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
Appellant's counsel moved the court at the time of 
final arguments in this case to send this matter to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission for a decision. Although the 
transcript of the final arguments was not prepared, the court's 
note at the end of its trial notes (R, 123) reflect that the 
issue was before the court and considered by it. Furthermore the 
issue was raised previously in response plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R, 90-95) 
It is safe to say that the case holdings on the issue 
before this court are sparse, and particularly those subsequent 
to 1980, when the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 was adopted by 
Congress. 
In order that Appellant not be deprived of its rights 
under the Constitution of the United States and under the laws of 
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this state, it is encumbent upon the court to submit the matter 
before it to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission ("ICC.11) There is not question but that the ICC has 
the power, authority and jurisdiction to deviate from the 
apparent requirements of §10761 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 
which the trial court in this case apparently feels it cannot do. 
In a case entitled Injected Rubber Products Corporation v. Branch 
Motor Express, Inc., numbered MC-C-30054, before the ICC on June 
21, 1981, the ICC stated as follows at page 4 of its decision: 
In our negotiated rates decision, we adopted a 
policy statement holding that the filed rate 
doctrine does not necessarily bar the shipper 
from asserting equitable defenses against an 
undercharge claim filed by a carrier. We 
considered and discussed jurisdictional 
arguments against this policy in Wakefern Food 
Corp. v. Southwest Frgt. Lines, Inc., !T~ICC2d 
814 (l3"57j^  where we rejected assertion that 
the charges contained in an applicable tariff 
must be assessed regardless of the 
circumstances. We concluded that the 
decisions in Negotiated Rates and Buckeye 
Cellulose Corp. v. L & N RR. Co., 1 ICC2d 767 
(1985), a?fTd sub. nom. "Seaboard System RR. v. 
United States, 794 F.2d 635 (11th Cir., 1915677 
conf irmed t hat our jurisdiction over 
unreasonable practices under §10701(a) and 
§10704 give us the authority to consider all 
the circumstances surrounding an undercharge 
suit. 
As previously stated, our jurisdiction over 
unreasonable practices gives us discretion to 
find that the tariff rate filed by a motor 
carrier need not and should not be applied in 
a particular case. Therefore, our role in 
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this proceeding is to undertake an advisory 
analysis of whether a negotiated but 
unpublished rate existed, the circumstances 
surrounding assessment of the tariff rate, and 
any other pertinent facts, and to determine 
(a) whether collection of undercharges based 
on rate contained in the published tariff 
would constitute an unreasonable practice, and 
(b) if a negotiated rate is found to exist, 
whether this amount is all that the carrier 
should be permitted to collect. 
Approximately one year later, on June 14, 1989, the ICC 
issued another opinion clarifying its authority to determine 
unreasonable practices. Because of the length of the opinion, 
the entire opinion is reproduced as Addendum A to this brief in 
compliance with the provisions of Rule 24(f), Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Generally, however, the decision acknowledges 
that (1) the ICC has primary jurisdiction over unreasonable 
practice issues; (2) that the unreasonable practice 
determinations of the ICC are binding dispositive of the issue of 
the maximum reasonable compensation the carrier may receive for 
the transportation involved; and that the determinations of the 
ICC are subject to judicial review only to determine that they 
are not arbitrary or capricious. 1989 MCC LEXIS 333, Page 2 
As relates directly to this case, the ICC in the 
opinion referred to herein stated at page 4, in reference to the 
case of Seaboard System RR. Co., Inc. v. United States, 794 F.2d 
635 (11th Cir., 1986) as follows: 
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We determined that a rail carrier's collection 
of undercharges would be an unreasonable 
practice, prohibited by §10701, where the 
carrier's tariff was unclear to the ordinary 
user and the shipper had relied on the 
carrier's misquotation of the applicable rate 
in determining to use the carrier for the 
involved transportation. 
'Appell ant believes that pursu • ' • •; •, Section 
7 of the Constitution of Utah, the decision of the Circuit Court 
in this case cannot withstand scrutiny. On the one hand, 
Respondent argues that a federal statute, i.e. 49 U.S.C. §10 761, 
preempts the laws of the state of Utah On the other hand, an 
agency of the federal government, the ICC, by its own fiat can 
relieve a person from its obligation to pay a certain tariff 
rate. Appellant believes that if the right is available on a 
federal level (through the ICC), then the right to assert the 
same defense on a should i lot be foreclosed, and tl le 
deprivation o^ that 4- constitutes a denial of due process 
and/or of equal protection to Appellant. 
It is fundamental under our system that a litigaiit have 
the oppoi: ti 11 iJ t;y t: : ". , , have [his] day in court on the merits 
of a controversy. Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Com1 11» ia- \2d 1293, 1296 (1982) and cases cited inerein. 
If the fie power to allow Appellant to have his 
dispute cm merits, and fails to exercise that power, thereby 
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foreclosing Appellant from such opportunity, it is a violation of 
Appellant's rights to due process of law. 
Furthermore, Appellant asserts that if his access to 
the ICC board is foreclosed by this court, and as a result 
thereof his claim is not heard on the merits, that his right to 
equal protection of laws has likewise been violated. Equal 
protection presupposes like treatment for persons similiarly 
situated. Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City, Utah 747 P.2d 
884, 887 (1988) Here, Appellant is being denied access to the 
ICC board while others presumably have access to it, without any 
justification for the denial. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant believes that there was no enforceable 
contract between the parties from the outset, and that judgment 
against Appellant below was inappropriate on that reason alone. 
The confusion relative to the number of trailers to be used to 
convey the cargo was a point of vital significance to the 
existence of the contract, and in the absence of an agreement on 
that point, the contract is void because of a lack of a ,rmeeting 
of the minds.11 
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Appellant also believes that Respondent, as a matter of 
law, failed at the time of trial to prove what the tariff rate 
actually was in the first instance, and in the second instance to 
prove its applicability to the contract between the parties. 
Because of the confusion surrounding the question of the number 
of trailers and the applicability of the tariff to those 
trailers, the contract was rendered void. Furthermore, in this 
regard Appellant urges this court to find that the authorities 
cited by the court are inapplicable to the facts of this case, 
since there was no negotiation of the rates, which is proscribed 
by the federal statute. 
Appellantfs third contention is that Respondent is 
bound by a restrictive indorsement on a check delivered to 
Respondent on July 31, 1987. Appellant believes that the 
circumstances resulting in the issuance and acceptance of the 
check had to do with the number of trailers and not the 
applicable tariff. 
Appellant's last contention is that primary 
jurisdiction to determine questions of this kind in any event 
lies with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and that the 
courtTs failiiit* ! \ rrlei I he mattei i I he Interstate Commerce 
Commission results, in and of itself, in reversible error. 
Furthermore, since the ICC has the apparent power to relieve a 
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shipper from the payment of undercharges under certain 
conditions, and the trial court apparently believed that it did 
not have that power, that to fail to refer this matter to the ICC 
for determination constitutes a taking of Appellant's property, 
i.e. its money, without due process of law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
1990. 
day of February, 
P£TER W. GUYON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
DATED this /6ft day of Februai 1990 
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ADDENDUM A 
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, * 
ni This decision embraces MC-C- 30090, National Industrial 
Transportation League-Petition for a Declaratory Order on 
Negotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
1989 MCC LEXIS 333 
June 14, 1989 
SYLLABUS: 
£*13 
Commission's authority to determine unreasonable practices clarified. 
Unreasonable practice issues arising in motor common carrier negotiated rates 
cases will be entertained without court referral. Petition requesting a general 
order declaring unreasonable the practice of negotiating but not publishing 
rates held in abeyance. 
PANEL: 
DECISION 
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *1 
separate expressions. Chairman Gradison dissented in part with a separate 
expression 
OPINION: 
The National Industrial Transportation League (NITL) has requested that we 
issue a general declaratory order finding that it is an unreasonable practice, 
and thus a violation of the Interstate Commerce Act, for a motor common carrier 
to conduct business on the basis of a negotiated and agreed-to rate while 
failing to publish the rate In an effective tariff on file at the Commission, 
We instituted a declaratory order proceeding under 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) and 
requested comments on the proposal. 
More than 40 comments were submitted. n2 The majority were from shippers and 
shipper trade associations supporting the C*23 proposal. Two motor 
carriers, a water carrier, two practitioners, counsel for an unsecured 
creditors' committee, a tariff publishing agent, an agent for bankrupt, estates, 
and the Household Goods Carriers1 Bureau, Inc. oppose any Commission action in 
this area. Two other parties, the Regular Common Carrier Conference and the 
American Trucking Associations, Inc., suggest that we await congressional action 
on the subject. 
After considering the NITL proposal in light of the comments received and our 
growing experience in the area, we have decided instead to reopen NITL — Pet. 
to Inst. Rule on Negotiated Motor Car., 3 l.C.C.2d 99 (1986) (Negotiated Rates) 
to clarify: that we have primary jurisdiction over unreasonable practice issues; 
that aur unreasonable practice determinations are thus [*33 binding and 
dispositive of the issue of the maximum reasonable compensation the carrier may 
2 
5 
5! 
S3 
By the Commission, Chairman Gradison, Vice Chairman Simmons, Commissioners mM 
Andre, Lamboley, and Phillips. Commissioners Andre and Phillips commented with ^ p | 
i 
CI 
r 
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *2 ^_ 
n2 National Motor Freight Traffic Association, Inc. filed a motion for § f ] 
acceptance of its comments one day late. Under 49 C.F.R. § 11105, we will ^ ' 
accept these comments. Transport Audit Service, Inc. also late-filed its J w j 
comments, but without a request for late acceptance. However, since OC 
consideration of its views will not prejudice any party, we will also accept its 
comments into the record. 
Ol 
2 
now'entertain unreasonable practice claims based on negotiated rates without d ^ 5 
awaiting a court referral. We believe it is preferable at this point to 5 ^ 5 
continue to handle negotiated rates claims on a case-by-case basis, (We have ^ ^ 
directed our staff to develop a flexible docket management plan for these cases 
which will include participation by our Office of Hearings to ensure their 
expeditious handling.) We will hold the petition in MC-C1 30090 in abeyance 
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *3 
for further consideration based on experience gained after implementation of 
these measures. 
BACKGROUND 
A motor common carrier is required, by 49 U.S-C. § 10761(a), to file tariffs 
setting forth its charges for all transportation services offered and to collect 
only the rates published in such filed tariffs. n3 However, the statute also 
contains a requirement, in 49 U.S.C. S 10701, that a carrier's practices C*4J 
be reasonable. n4 
n3 Section 10761(a) states that a "carrier may not charge or receive a 
different compensation for that transportation or service than the rate 
specified in the tariff * * *" 
n4 Section 10701(a) states, "A rate (other than a rail rate), classification, 
rule, or practice related to transportation or service * * * must be 
reasonable." 
In the past, the filed rate requirement of § 10761(a) was applied strictly. 
Indeed ignorance or misquotation of a carrier's rates generally was not accepted 
as an excuse for a shipper to pay other than the tariff rate., See, e.g., A.6. 
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *4 
Poor Grain Co. v. C.B. & Q. Ry. Co., 12 I.C.C. 418, 422-423 (1907); Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915)(Maxwell). During an era of 
substantial entry, rate regulation, and contracting limitations strict adherence 
to the tariff rate was seen as necessary to avoid intentional misquotation of 
rates by carriers seeking to discriminate in favor of particular shippers. See 
Western Transp. Co. v. Wilson and Company, Inc., 682 F.2d 1227, 1230 (7th Cir. 
1982). 
In the mare competitive, more flexible pricing atmosphere created by 1980 
deregulatory legislation, however, there is C*53 little likelihood of 
carriers using a rate misquotation as a means to discriminate in favor of 
particular shippers. Thus, in Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. L&N R.R. Co., 1 
I.C.C.2d 767 (1985) (Buckeye), Aff'd sub nom. Seaboard System R.R. Co., Inc. v. 
United States, 794 F.2d 635 (11th Cir. 1986) (Seaboard), we determined that a 
rail carrier's collection of undercharges would be an unreasonable practice, 
prohibited by § 10701, where the carrier's tariff was unclear to the ordinary 
user and the shipper had relied on the carrier's misquotation of the applicable 
rate in determining to use the carrier for the involved transportation. 
In Negotiated Rates, supra, we extended the unreasonable practice analysis to 
certain, narrowly defined circumstances in the motor carrier industry. We had 
observed a disturbing pattern that, in the highly competitive environment 
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created by the Motor Carrier Act of 198QT certain carHpr*f h^H faiTprf tn £iia^ 
j^nmrn^JiJilLmnny rntrr. nognti^tPd daily. At thp tin^ p nt ghipmpntj thnnp ^ 
carriers had chaxflgd-thg rate they had negotiate* *n attract thE' trs>ffir.7 hut _ 
^t^nJHTtpr tnffpn miirh IntnrO thny7.nr mnrp nftPn thpir trugtppc, in bankruptcy-,— 
C*6J undercharges (to receive the diffprpncg 
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encouraging pricing innovation and competition, and would not be necessary to 
prevent discrimination. 
We recognized that, under 49 U.S.C. §§ 11705(b)(3) and 11706(c)(2), 
undercharge claims are brought in Federal District Courts, not before the 
Commission. Therefore, we lack the authority ourselves directly to waive motor 
carrier undercharges. Accordingly, we offered, upon court referral, to give our 
"advisory opinion" as to whether in a particular case collection of undercharges 
would constitute an unreasonable practice. 
Since then, numerous courts have referred individual claims to us for an 
unreasonable practice determination under our Negotiated Rates policy statement. 
n5 However, as NITL points out, some courts have denied shipper motions for 
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referral of an unreasonable practice claim. n6 NITL believes that these denials 
of referral t>7] requests are prompted by our own characterization of our 
decisions as "advisory." Courts viewing our unreasonable practice finding as 
merely a non-binding recommendation may believe they are bound by the statute 
and by stare decisis to enforce collection of the filed rate. 
n5 The Commission has issued decisions on the merits based upon its 
Negotiated Rates policy in over 50 cases. Numerous other cases referred by the 
courts have been decided an other grounds, such as tariff applicability. 
n6 See, e.g., Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. Robert Yaquinto, Jr., 869 f.2d 
1487 (Sth'cir. 1989)-, Motor Carrier Audit & Collection Co. v. United food 
Service, Inc., (Case No. 87-C-29998, (D. Col. May 4, 1987), and West Coast Truck 
Lines, Inc. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co. (No. C-87-0048 MHP), (N.D. Cal. 
July 28, 1987). 
NITL argues that our issuance of its proposed declaratory order would 
terminate the controversy among the courts by establishing that: (1) our 
jurisdiction over reasonableness issues is plenary and exclusive; and (2) our 
findings of unreasonableness are binding upon the courts (unless timely appealed 
and overturned on court review). NITL also^argues that a general [*8] 
finding would reduce litigation burdens by allowing courts to apply that 
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finding to the facts of particular cases without going through the referral 
process. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Commission Jurisdiction. 
We now see that our "advisory opinion" language may have been a source of 
confusion and requires clarification. n7 It was used only to illustrate that 
this agency's unreasonable practice finding in certain instances may not be 
self-enforcing (since courts, not the Commission, have the more narrower 
authority to order or deny payment of undercharges in a particular case), and 
would be issued only in response to a court referral of the unreasonable 
practice issue. 
n7 An additional notice and comment period is not necessary merely to clarify 
our prior decision in Negotiated Rates, supra. However, since NITL raised the 
"advisory opinion" issue in MC-C- 30090, all interested parties have had, in 
fact, an additional opportunity to comment on this matter. 
In fact, it is well-established that a transportation regulatory agency such 
as ours has primary jurisdiction to determine whether a carrier practice is 
reasonable. Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elev. Co., 259 U.S. [*9] 285, 
291 (1922)("Whenever a * * * practice is attacked as unreasonable * *.*, there 
must be preliminary resort to the Commission"); United States v. Western Pac. R. 
Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 304 
(1976)(Nader). The Commission has possessed this authority, to declare motor 
carrier practices unreasonable, since 1935. n8 The many courts that have 
recently referred negotiated rates claims to us have recognized this agency's 
proper role in these matters. n9 
n8 As originally enacted, Section 216(b) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 
provided: 
It shall be the duty of every common carrier of property by motor vehicle * * 
* to establish, observe, and enforce * * * 311st and reasonable regulations and 
practices relating Cto transporation of property in interstate or foreign 
commerce] * * *. 
49 Stat. 558 (1935). 
n9 See, e.g., Orr Y. Sewell Plastics, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Tenn. 
1988), appeal pending, Nos. 89-51089 and 89-5110 (6th Cir.HOrr); Maislin 
Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo. 
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1988), appeal pending, No. 88-2267-WM (8th Cir.)(Maislin). 
n10 This is not to say that at some future date we could not issue a rule 
that the courts could apply themselves to individual cases. This has happened 
in the past when, for example, courts have applied Commission-established 
principles in misrouting cases. SeeJohnson Machine Works, Inc. v. Chicago, 
Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co., 297 F.2d 793, 796-799 (8th Cir. 1962). . 
More fundamentally, these determinations involve a harmonization of two 
different provisions of the same [*11] statute. Section 10761 is only part 
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of an overall regulatory scheme; it should not be elevated over the unreasonable 
practices provision of S 10701. Rather, there must be a balance drawn among the 
sometimes competing congressional goals of fairness, competition, 
nondiscrimination, and uniformity. The prime authority to harmonize and give 
effect to these policies in a reasonableness determination is the Commission, as 
the agency charged with administering the statute overall. Seaboard, supra, 794 
F.2d at 638, citing Nader, supra, 426 U.S. at 304; Hudson Transit Lines, Inc. v. 
ICC, 765 F.2d 329, 336 (2nd Cir. 1985). 
B. Interplay Between Filed Rate Requirement and Reasonable Practice 
Requirement. 
Some courts have concluded that they are barred from giving effect to our 
unreasonable practice findings in a negotiated rates case by Qudicial precedent 
*-••---»- *-» *-- — <i+-ih.i~ j«£n«rnc +n f-hD rnllprtinn nf thP filed 
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Some courts, however, in declining to refer claims O103 to us, have 
suggested that our unreasonable practice findings are no more than responses to 
ordinary contract questions and thus do not require an expert agency's 
consideration. This is an inappropriately narrow view of our role. Our 
Negotiated Rates policy stems from our expert analysis of current regulatory and 
competitive conditions in the nation's motor carrier industry. While the ^ ^ ^ 
factual determinations in each case do have contract elements, the facts are ^ ^ 1 
evaluated and ultimate conclusions reached in the context of what practices are ™ 
reasonable under current conditions in the industry. This is precisely the kind 
of determination to be made by an expert agency. Nader, supra, 426 U.S. at 304. 
n1Q 5 
©I 
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iiuu ucuiiiune wnKLntr a carrier's solicitation, publication and billing 
practices are unreasonable. Orr, supra, 705 F. Supp. at 679, Maxwell, supra 
"dealt with the courts' C*12 3 authority to grant equitable defenses to 
undercharge actions." Seaboard, supra, 794 F.2d at 638 (emphasis in original). 
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Our unreasonable practice findings are legal, rather than purely equitable 
determinations and derive from our obligation under S 10701 to ensure that 
practices in the nation's motor carrier industry are reasonable. n11 An 
unreasonable practice determination is separate and apart from the filed rate 
doctrine embodied in § 10761(a); it is a determination of a violation of 
another, co-equal provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, prohibiting carriers 
fi^ om engaging in unreasonable practices. If rates and practices are not 
reasonable, the filed rate requirement does not apply, as the Supreme Court 
specifically recognized in Maxwell, supra, 237 U.S. at 97: Under the Interstate 
Commerce Act, the rate of the carrier duly filed is the only lawful charge. 
Deviation from it is not permitted upon any pretext. Shippers and travellers 
are charged with notice of it, and they as well as the carrier must abide by it, 
unless it is found by the Commission to be unreasonable. (Emphasis addedN.) 
n11 We recognize that Negotiated Rates, supra, and some of our subsequent 
decisions spoke in terms of "equitable defenses" to claims for undercharges. 
While our unreasonable practice rulings are "equitable" in the sense that they 
are intended to result in decisions that are fair to the parties, they are based 
upon the legal requirements of § 10701 and may be more appropriately viewed as 
the basis for a counterclaim or as mooting the original action for undercharges. 
See Orr, supra. 
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Rather than creating an exception or defense to the filed rate doctrine, what 
the Commission is finding to be an unreasonable practice is a course of conduct 
consisting of: (1) negotiating a rate; (2) agreeing to a rate that the shipper 
reasonably relies upon as being lawfully fi£ed; (3) failing, either willfully or 
otherwise, to publish the rate; (4) billing and accepting payment at the 
negotiated rate for (sometimes) numerous shipments; and (5) then demanding 
additional payment at higher rates. C*133 
The Court amplified this in Arizona Grocery v. A.T.S.F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 
370, 384 (1932), where it distinguished between legal rates, "that is, those 
which must be charged to all shippers alike", and lawful rates, which are those 
that are reasonable. Legal rates are lawful only if they are reasonable; "* * * 
the shipper was bound to pay the legal rate; but if he could show that it was 
unreasonable he might recover reparation." Id. Similarly, a court refusal to 
enforce the (legal) tariff rate when the collection of that rate is unlawful 
(i.e., when the Commission has determined that the collection of the tariff rate 
constitutes an unreasonable practice) accords with established law. n12 In these 
circumstances, rather than abrogating the filed rate doctrine (as some carrier 
interests have argued), this construction of the Act appropriately reconciles §§ 
10701 and 10761. n13 
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n12 Maxwell and Arizona Grocery involved the reasonableness of the rate 
levels rather than the reasonableness of the practices. However, the same 
statutory language applies to both. See 49 u.S.C. S 10701(a) 
n13 See Orr, supra, 703 F. Supp. at 679: 
still as valid as ever. But where the doctrine is applied in a wooden, rigid 
manner that is contrary to congressional policy with respect to the interstate 
trucking industry, the ICC has decided that it will consider all the 
circumstances before determining whether an undercharge assessment is consistent 
with the spirit of the statute. Nor does this policy undercut the mandate of 49 
U.S.C. § 10761(a) that a "carrier may not charge or receive a different 
compensation for that transportation or service than the rate specified in the 
tariff* * * * This blanket prohibition is tempered by the ICC's jurisdiction to 
declare some practices to be "unreasonable" under 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a). 
Accord Carolina Motor Express, Inc. v. Delaware Valley Shippers Ass'n, No. 
SE-C-87-147, slip opinion at 7-8 (W.D. N.C. April 20, 1989) ("To hold the filed 
rate doctrine to be infallible under all circumstances would, in effect, allow 
common carriers to have their cake and eat it too * * * a finding of the ICC 
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that a collection of undercharges would be an unreasonable practice is not 
contrary to law in appropriate cases."); Maislin, supra, 705 F. Supp. at 1406 (" 
* * * we emphasize that the ICC is not abolishing the requirement in S 10761 * * 
* " ) . £*143 
The fact that the Commission may not have exercised its unreasonable practice 
authority in the negotiated rates area in this manner until recently does not 
mean that the agency lacks such authority or cannot use it in this manner. See 
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 682, 693-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 
cert, denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974), citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 
U.S. 632, 647-48 (1950) (neither failure of the FTC since its creation to 
exercise certain power nor intermittent statements that it lacked such power 
deprived agency from exercising a power granted by Congress). The present 
exercise of this authority responds to current marketplace developments and 
problems and is warranted and justified on the evidentiary record of the cases 
presented to the Commission. 
The court referral procedure is not new, nor is it unlawful (as some carrier 
interests have suggested) because it permits the courts and the Commission 
acting together to allow defenses the court could not entertain alone. It has 
long been recognized that the statute implrcitly permits a judicial remedy (with 
initial referral to the Commission) for unreasonable practices. See 
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Hewitt-Robins C*153 v. Freight-ways, 371 U.S. 84 (1962). 
That implicit authority was later made explicit by Congress, and discussed in 
the rate reasonableness context in Informal Procedure for Determining 
Reparation, 335 I.C.C. 403 (1969). Briefly, prior to 1959, the Act conferred no 
explicit authority upon the Commission to award reparations in cases involving 
motor carrier rates or practices. The Commission, however, tooK the view that 
it had implicit authority to pass on the lawfulness of motor carrier rates, but 
(since it lacked authority to award reparations) refrained from exercising that 
authority except upon a court referral. In 1959, the Supreme Court ruled that 
neither the courts nor the Commission could consider, in post-shipment 
litigation, the reasonableness of a motor carriers rates. n14 As a result, in 
1965 Congress passed the provisions that are now codified at 49 U.S.C. SS 
11705(b)(3) and 11706(c)(2). n15 
n14 T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959). For unreasonable 
practices, Hewitt-Robins found that an implicit judicial remedy was consistent 
with the statutory scheme, and that T.I.M.E. therefore did not apply to practice 
cases. Hewitt-Robins, 371 U.S. at 89. 
n15 Prior section 204a for motor carriers. C*163 
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Section 11705(b)(3) imposes liability for damages resulting from violations 
of the Act upon motor common carriers, n16 Section 11706(c)(2) permits recovery 
of damages under § 11705(b)(3) in a "civil action11 instituted within two years 
after the claim accrues. n17 What Congress intended was to restore the procedure 
that existed prior to T.I.M.E., supra (see n. 13): that shippers1 recourse for 
reparations must be to the courts, but before a court may award reparations, it 
must refer to the Commission any counterclaim that the rates (or, as here, 
practices) have not been reasonable. Informal Procedure, 335 I.C.C. at 413. 
Accord United States v. Associated Transport, Inc. 505 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
n16 Section 11705(b)(3) states: "A common carrier providing transportation or 
service subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under subchapter II [motor 
carriers] * * * is liable for damages resulting from the imposition of rates for 
transportation or service the Commission finds to be in violation of this 
subtitle." 
© 
recover damages. [*173 
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The referral of negotiated rates cases to the Commission for determination of 
the unreasonable practice issue, followed by enforcement of the Commission's 
findings by the court, thus follows a long-standing procedure « codified in 
1965 but based upon authority that was implicit before that. Contentions by 
carrier interests that Commission findings may be ignored because the Commission 
cannot enforce them, or that court adoptions of them are somehow unlawful 
because courts may not themselves grant "equitable defenses" to undercharge 
actions, are thus without merit. n18 
n18 We emphasize again that our findings vis-a-vis the statutory provisions 
concerning unreasonable practices under S 10701 are not "equitable defenses" but 
enforcement of affirmative statutory requirements and obligations. 
C. Policy Considerations. 
As we have explained, our Negotiated Rates policy does not represent a 
relaxed interpretation of S 10751, but rather a separate determination under § 
10701. But even if it were viewed as a reinterpretation of a previously strict 
construction of S 10761, it would be one that is well within this agency's 
authority (and indeed duty) to reinterpret the Interstate C*18] Commerce 
Act, based upon experience gained and changing circumstances. As explained by 
the Supreme Court: 
of the relevant facts and its mandate, may alter its past interpretation and 
overturn past administrative rulings and practices * * *. Regulatory agencies 
do not establish rules of conduct to last forever, they are supposed, within the 
limits of the law and of fair and prudent administration, to adapt their rules 
and practices to the nation's needs in a volatile changing economy. They are 
neither required nor supposed to regulate the present and the future within the 
inflexible limits of yesterday. 
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 
397, 416 (1967) (ATA). 
Our Negotiated Rates policy is fully consistent with the policy goals of the 
Interstate Commerce Act. Carriers are still required to file their rates in 
5 
n17 This is in contrast to S§ 11705(b)(2) and 11706(c)(1), which impose 
l i a b i l i t y for damages on r a i l (subchapter I) and water (subchapter I I I ) carr iers ^ ^ 
and expressly authorize persons to " f i l e a complaint w i th the Commission" to V ^ [ 
r aoes. ] ™ 
53 
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CTlhe Commission, faced with new developments or in light of reconsideration V ^ 
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carrier negotiated rates 0193 abuses, where the shipper's reliance on the I O 
rate quoted was reasonable under the circumstances, should not lead to any ^ ™ 
widespread disregard for the tariff filing requirement. In fact, there has been 
nothing in the records of the cases we have reviewed to suggest that it was the 
intent of the parties to establish secret, discriminatory rates. Rather, the 
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Nor do we anticipate this policy, which is limited to narrow :ircumstances, 
to lead to unreasonable discrimination. Shippers m today's marketplace 
[*203 are protected from unreasonable discrimination by vigorous competition. 
As a result of changes in the law and our interpretation of it, the range of 
activities considered discriminatory is much narrower than it formerly was. 
One of the most significant changes m the motor carrier industry has been 
the substantial loosening of entry controls. In 1979 (immediately prior to the 
Motor Carrier Act of 19B0), there were approximately 17,000 regulated motor 
common carriers. n19 Because of relaxed entry requirements, there are now more 
than 39,000 motor carriers of property operating in the United States. n20 
Moreover, prior to 1980, carriers' operating authority was often narrowly 
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circumscribed, both with respect to the territory to be served and the 
commodities to be carried. Today, carriers can obtain readily a license to 
transport virtually all types of commodities throughout the contiguous 48 
states. n21 Thus, today, shippers do not depend upon regulation to protect them 
from discriminatory pricing; in most circumstances, there are simply more 
competitive options. Cf. Cent. & Southern Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n v. U.S., 
757 F.2d 301, 325-326 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
n19 H.Rep. No. 96-1069, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News, 2283, 2284. 
n2Q Forthcoming Interstate Commerce Commission 1988 Annual Report Appendix E, 
Table 1. 
n21 See Acceptable Forms of Requests for Operating Authority, 133 M.C.C. 329 
(1984), and cases cited therein. C*213 
?*i 
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carriers simply negotiated these rates to attract business, not with any intent 
to prefer one of their shippers to the disadvantage of others. Indeed, the 
effort was to promote and sell the carrier's service generally, not to attact a 
particular customer. The shipper made its determination to use the carrier's 
service based on the quoted rate. To permit the carrier subsequently to collect 
a substantially different higher rate for the past transportation service ^^^ 
because if failed to publish the rate would be antithetical to a fundamental ^^^ 
purpose of publishing rates — i.e., to permit shippers to choose the best rate ™ 
for their shipments from among those offered by competing carriers. 5 
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In addition, given the statutory policy of encouraging a variety of price and j»* 
service options, activities are now permitted that previously would have been ^ ^ 
considered discriminatory. Negotiated Rates, 3 I.C.C.Zd at 106. Volume ^ ^ 
discount rates, for example, are not per se discriminatory. Lawfulness of Vol. ^ * 
Discount Rates-Mot. Com. Car., 365 I.C.C. 711 (1982). They may, for example, #J 
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be justified by cost savings achieved by the carrier. Id. at M 5 . There are ^ J 
other means of lawfully and reasonably assessing different rates for different ^ E 
shippers. For example, rates specified for a particular shipper are no lonqer ^ J 
per se discriminatory. Rates for a Named Shipper or Receiver, 367 I.C.C. 959 M 
(1984). Carriers may limit the shippers to whom rates apply by establishing II 
.*r,H,,^ ort r^toc hw i tpw nuitthpr^  listed in the National Motor Freight Sk. 
0) Most significantly, a carrier may now hold both common and contract operating authority. n22 For operations conducted under contract authority, carriers do not have to file their rates, n23 nor are they subject to the antidiscrimination [*223 provisions of the Act. n24 The 1980 Act also greatly broadened the scope ® 
of contract service by, inter alia, removing limits on the number of shippers a 
contract carrier could serve n25 and by removing restrictions on the nature of 
shippers, commodities shipped, and permissible geographic scope of contract 
carrier permits. n26 Therefore, motor common carriers that desire for some 
reason to discriminate among shippers in their rates (for example, to offer ^ ^ ^ 
lower rates to large shippers) may do so lawfully simply by obtaining contract ^ ^ 1 
carrier authority. ™ 
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n22 Deletion of 49 C.F.R. § 10Q4.3 Dual Operations Policy (not printed), 
served July 2, 1980; Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-296, section 
10(b), 94 Stat. 793, 800 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10930(a)). 
n23 Exemption-MTR. Contr. Car.-Tariff Filing Requirements, 133 M.C.C. 150 
(1983), aff'd sub nom. Central & Southern Motor Freight Association v. United 
States, 757 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
n24 Cent. & Southern Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n, supra at n, 152, citing 49 
U.S.C. §§ 10704(c) and 10741(b). 
n25 Id., section 10(a)(1), 94 Stat, at 799-800. 
n26 Id. at section 10(a)(3), 94 Stat, at 800 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 
10923(d)(1)). C*233 
Hundreds, or even thousands, of individual motor common carrier rates are now 
negotiated daily. Moreover, reduced tariff rates may now be filed to become 
effective on one day's notice. n27 In these circumstances, it would be extremely 
difficult for shippers to determine, prior to an initial movement, whether the 
agreed-upon rate is actually on file (or what rates their competitors are 
paying). Moreover, as we have said before, "an inflexible policy [would] 
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frustrate the intent of the [national transportation policy] to encourage price 
innovation, since it could chill rate negotiation between shippers and carriers, 
and inhibit legitimate pricing initiatives." Negotiated Rates, supra, at 106. 
n28 Preventing unreasonable discrimination is only one of several important 
goals set forth by Congress, and should not necessarily be elevated above all 
other concerns. n29 
n27 Short Notice Effectiveness for Independently Filed Rates, 1 I.C.C.2d 146 
(1984), aff'd sub nom. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. U.S., 773 
F.2d 1561 (1985). 
n28 Accord In re: Carolina Motor Express, Inc., supra, slip op. at 8; Orr, 
supra, 703 F. Supp at 680. 
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n29 Some courts have cited Square D. v. Niagara Frontier Traffic Bureau, 476 
U.S. 409 (1986) for the proposition that, because Congress has not abolished the 
tariff filing requirement, the Commission (and the courts) cannot disturb the 
filed rate doctrine. Square D is inapposite because it dealt with the courts' 
authority to depart from long-standing court created precedent, which was deemed 
to have worked well and was believed to have been adopted by Congress, not an ^ ^ 
agency's right to interpret (see Morton Salt, supra) or reinterpret (see ATA, i ^ | 
supra) its own statute. This agency possessed the statutory authority to set Mm 
2 
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three specific references to the Commission's power to set aside rates contained 
in published tariffs. Square D, supra, at 416; 416, n. 18; and 418, n. 22. 
Moreover, court adherence to court-created precedent of long standing is not 
inviolable. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 57 U.S.L.U., 
4539, 4541, Justice Stevens' dissent. Thus we are not pursuaded that the policy 
announced in Negqtlated Rates, supra, would be foreclosed even if it had be^n 
based on no more than our reinterpretation of S 10761. 
However, as discussed supra, while the pro-competitive policy in the 1980 
legislation and the resulting sweeping changes in the motor carrier industry 
provided the changed circumstances that were sufficient to justify reexamination 
of the file rate doctrine, they were not the source of our authority to make the 
limited exception thereto embodied in the Negotiated Rates policy. That 
authority came from S 10701 itself and our judicially recognized authority to 
determine what constitutes an unreasonable rate practice in the transportation 
industries we regulate. C*24] ® 
In sum, we are persuaded that the carrier practice of negotiating a rate, 
failing to publish that rate, and then later (often many months or years and 
numerous shipments later) billing at a higher rate is unreasonable in today's 
environment in the motor carrier industry. We are also satisfied that this 
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conclusion is fully consistent with the language and goals of the Interstate 
Commerce Act, and indeed is necessary because of the many changed circumstances 
in regulation and competition that have occured in the motor carrier industry. 
D. Court Referral. 
As a matter of administrative procedure we previously stated that we would 
exercise our discretionary declatory order authority to resolve unreasonable 
practice claims based on negotiated rates only upon a court referral of the 
case. n30 We explained that the typical case affects only the immediate parties 
involved and has no overriding policy issues beyond those already addressed in 
our Negotiated Rates, supra, decision. n31 In addition, these cases were likely 
to go to court eventually, and there would bg little or no savings in legal 
costs in coming to the Commission first. n32 
n30 Negotiated Rates, supra, served August 25, 1987. We also believed that 
following a number of decisions on referral: (1) the courts would implement our 
negotiated rates policy through application of our precedent; and/or (2) 
carriers or their agents would no longer seek to recover undercharges in the 
face or our consistent findings. 
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n31 We had previously announced a policy as to tariff applicability 
questions, which were numerous and complex, that because of limited agency 
resources, we would resolve only those disputes that are referred by a court or 
involve broad issues of industry-wide application. Docket No. 37476, Intercity 
Transportation Company Petition for Declaratory Order - Classification of 
Battery Pack Cabinets (not printed), served August 30, 1983, aff'd., Intercity 
Transportation Company, et ai. v. United States, 737 F.2d 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
n32 The decision also noted that we waive our usual filing fee for cases 
referred to us by a court. Ue have recently stated our belief that "it is 
appropriate to take a consistent approach with respect to the assessment of fees 
for * * * [negotiated rates] cases, whether or not they are referred to us by a 
court." Ex Parte No. 246 (Sub-No. 7), Regulations Governing Fees for Services 
Performed in Connection with Licensing and Related Services - 1989 Update (not 
printed), served June 9, 1989, at 5. Accordingly, we have held that "For the 
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In light of our experience since then, we now have decided to accept 
petitions for a declaratory order based on negotiated rates claims without a 
prior court referral. n33 As with the "advisory opinion" language, it is 
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possible that our prior reluctance to hear these cases may have .suggested to 
courts an ambivalence on our part as to our proper role in this area. Our 
decision to entertain these petitions without a court referral reflects and 
underscores our primary jurisdiction over the unreasonable practice issues that 
arise in these cases. 
Moreover, f>263 while each individual case affects primarily the parties 
to that case, each case is also part of what now is clearly a growing pattern 
and nationwide problem of large scope, and, cumulatively, may affect litigation 
in other cases. As mentioned above, we have already resolved over 50 negotiated 
rates cases and there have been numerous others that district courts have 
declined to refer to us. Millions of dollars are involved in these cases. 
1989 MCC LEXIS 333, *26 
The Congressionally mandated goals of encouraging competition, innovative 
pricing, nondiscrimination, and reasonable practices are also at stake. To the 
extent that entertaining declaratory order petitions without awaiting court 
referral will increase uniformity in court decisions and help in resolving this 
national problem, we must commit ourselves tQ doing everything within our 
jurisdiction to solve the problem. 
We clearly have the authority to accept such petitions whether or not a court 
suit had been filed. Under section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
we have broad discretion to "issue a declaratory order to terminate a 
controversy or remove uncertainty." A controversy or uncertainty can exist even 
if no court proceedings are C*273 pending at the time of the administrative 
proceeding. See State of Texas Y. United States, 866 F.2d 1546 (5th Cir. 1989). 
Once a carrier has billed for undercharges that the shipper believes are 
unreasonable, an uncertainty or controversy can exist. 
E. NITL's General Finding Request 
In light of our clarification and modification of our negotiated rates policy 
and procedures here, we believe that it is preferable to implement these matters 
first. If experience shows that NITL's petition for a general declaratory order 
remains necessary or useful, we can act at that time. 
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NITL's primary reason for the declaratory order ~ to answer the confusion 
stemming from our "advisory opinion" language — has been met by our 
clarification here of our primary jurisdiction over questions of the 
reasonableness of practices. Commission consideration of these cases will 
permit a uniform (and appropriately limited) application of our negotiated rates 
policy. At some future date, based upon our experience with these cases, we may 
develOD Genera l r u l e ^ Which thp rnurtc; r-an then annlu t n f a r f i i n i H o f o r m i « n f , - n « , 
n33 We may announce our intention to entertain such declaratory order 
petitions without seeking public comment on the specific question. Whether or 
not to issue a declaratory order is a discretionary matter, and we have in the 
past, without prior notice and comment, made general pronouncements about our 
willingness (or unwillingness) to entertain particular Kinds of declaratory ^ » 
order petitions. See Battery Pack Cabinets, supra. In any event, the general ^ * V 
question of declaratory order requirements was presented again in the NIT1 *^ ^ 
petition in No. MC-C- 3Q090. Thus, advance notice (even though not required) 
has been provided. 
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• This decision will not significantly affect either the quality of the human 
environment or the conservation of energy resources. It is issued pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. § 553, and 49 U.S.C. §§ 10321 and 10701(a). It is ordered: 
1. The late-filed comments of the National Motor Freight Traffic 
Association, Inc. and of Transport Audit Service, Inc. are accepted. 
2. Ex Parte No. MC-177 is reopened and consolidated with Ex Parte No. 
MC-C- 30090. 
3. Our prior findings in Ex Parte No. MC-177 are clarified and modified to 
the extent discussed above. 
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4. The petition for declaratory order filed by the National Industrial 
Transportation League will be held in abeyance. 
5. Notice of this decision will be published in the Federal Register and the 
ICC Register on June 30, 1989. 
6- This decision is effective on June 29, 1989. 
DISSENTBY: ANDRE; PHILLIPS; GRADISON (In Part) 
DISSENT: 
COMMISSIONER ANDRE, commenting: 
While I agree with the approach taken in this decision, I would have also 
granted the petition in MC-C- 30Q9Q without holding that proceeding in 
abeyance. 
COMMISSIONER PHILLIPS, commenting: 
The "negotiated rates" or "undercharge" issue has brought substantial 
uncertainty and turmoil to the shipping t*29] community in recent years. 
Under current law, carriers are obligated to file tariffs with the Commission 
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I am very pleased with the Commission's action in this decision, in which we 
further clarify and enunciate our policy regarding negotiated rates cases. By 
reopening Ex Parte No. MC-177, we are clarifying the following: (1) that our 
opinions in negotiated rates cases represent the exercise of the Commission's 
primary jurisdiction and thus are binding and only subject to judicial review 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard; (2) that we will consider 
negotiated rates cases without court referral; and (3) that O30] we will 
continue to handle these cases on a case-by-case basis 
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showing each rate negotiated, and the "filed rate doctrine" prohibits variations 
from these filed tariffs. Unfortunately, for any number of reasons, carriers at 
times do not file tariffs for rates that have been agreed upon by the shipper ^k^ 
and the carrier. While shippers should seeK to ensure that carriers do file iSSi 
tariffs for rates which they have negotiated and upon which they have agreed, ^ ^ » 
the fact remains that the shippers alone frequently are being held accountable 
for carriers1 failures to file tariffs, often years after the transportation in 
question occurred. M 
r-
I believe the Commission's action here will strengthen the legal posture of 1 1 1 
shippers who seek to rely on the Commission's MC-177 policy in obtaining relief S ^ ^ 
in negotiated rates cases. Further, I am hopeful that our clarified policy will j^S 
encourage swifter resolution of these cases. Lastly, I support our decision ^ ^ 
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declaratory order stating in general terms the circumstances when the collection 
of alleged undercharges would constitute an unreasonable practice would leave 
the determination as to whether any particular set of facts amounts to an 
unreasonable practice to the courts. Under current case law, it is not clear 
that such an approach would be sufficiently persuasive to some courts to 
increase the probability that a shipper making the types of showings required by 
such a declaratory order would prevail. This is not to say, however, that the 
declaratory order approach does not have merit. Rather, I believe that by 
holding the petition in HOC- 3QQ90 in abeyance, in conjunction with our action 
in Ex Parte No. MC-177, the Commission will i>313 be able to assess the 
progress made under the policies enunciated in this decision and to reconsider 
adoption of the MC-C- 30090 petition should it appear to be the most 
advantageous course of action in the future. 
CHAIRMAN GRADISON, dissenting in part: 
The majority refuses to take the one final step which could be taken 
administratively to help alleviate the negotiated rates difficulties which 
continue to plague shippers. The majority fails to articulate why it will not 
do the one thing which the petitioner has asked us to do: issue a declaratory 
order finding that it is an unreasonable practice and thus a violation of the 
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Interstate Commerce Act for a motor common carrier to conduct business on the 
basis of a negotiated and agreed to rate while failing to publish that rate in a 
tariff on file at this Commission. Surely the petitioner is in the best 
position to know what administrative assistance would be most helpful to its 
members in defending themselves against the unreasonable carrier practices 
addressed in this proceeding. Under these circumstances, the majority's 
decision falls short of providing the full measure of regulatory relief 
available by its reluctance to provide [*323 all of the assistance requested. 
Three years ago when the Commission first began its endeavors in Ex Parte No. 
MC-177 we moved very cautiously along the then uncharted waters surrounding 
motor common carrier negotiated rates problems. Today, after gaining several 
years experience, there can be no doubt thajt the Commission can, and must, move 
decisively to counteract the blatant abuse of a regulatory system by a small, 
but persistent, group of motor common carriers. Out of overriding concern for 
those shippers who must continue to defend themselves against these unreasonable 
rates practices, I would go a full step further than the majority and grant the 
NITL's request for a declaratory order. 
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